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What Is the Essential Fourth Amendment?
MORE ESSENTIAL THAN EVER: THE FOURTH AMENDMENT IN THE TWENTYFIRST CENTURY. By Stephen J. Schulhofer. New York, New York:

Oxford University Press, 2012. 216 pages. $21.95.

Reviewed by Christopher Slobogin*
I.

Introduction

To the average American, the Fourth Amendment probably brings to
mind a jumbled notion of warrants, probable cause, and exclusion of illegally
seized evidence. Compared to the First Amendment, Miranda's right to
remain silent,' the jury trial guarantee,2 and the Equal Protection Clause's
prohibition on racial discrimination, the right to be secure from
unreasonable searches and seizures is not well understood by most of the
populace, either in its precise scope or its rationale.
Some confusion about specific Fourth Amendment prohibitions is
tolerable and understandable. After all, it is the job of the police and judges,
not Joe Q. Citizen, to apply search and seizure law, and even these
government actors are more than occasionally flummoxed by the rules.
Public ignorance about the Amendment's rationale is perhaps just as
excusable, but it is much more unfortunate. People do not always understand
why the law appears to prefer a judge's opinion over that of the streetwise
cop, why a person who has nothing to hide should care about official
surveillance, or why a person who does have something to hide should be
able to exclude evidence of guilt because the police violated some arcane
rule. As a result, citizens are often outraged by judicial opinions that free
defendants on "technicalities," 4 and seldom are bothered by those court
decisions-much more prevalent in the past several decades-that curtail
liberty and privacy in the name of crime control and national security.
Stephen Schulhofer sees this as a problem, and in More Essential Than
Ever: The Fourth Amendment in the Twenty-First Century5 he tries to redress
it. Pitched toward a general audience rather than the legally trained, the book

* Milton Underwood Professor of Law, Vanderbilt University Law School.
1. Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 444 (1966) ("Prior to any questioning, the person must be
warned that he has a right to remain silent. . .
2. U.S. CONST. amend. VI.
3. Id amend. XIV, § 1.
4. See generally William A. Geller, Is the Evidence in on the ExclusionaryRule?, 67 A.B.A. J.

1642, 1645 (1981) (discussing the public policy debate over the exclusionary rule).
5. STEPHEN J. SCHULHOFER, MORE ESSENTIAL THAN EVER: THE FOURTH AMENDMENT INTHE
TWENTY-FIRST CENTURY (2012).
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provides a passionate defense of the "essential" Fourth Amendment that, as
Schulhofer would have it, the Founders intended but the current Supreme
Court has ignored. Much of what is said in this book will not be new to
Fourth Amendment scholars. But the work's straightforward eloquence
provides a strong, popularized brief for interpreting the Fourth Amendment
as a command that judicial review precede all nonexigent police investigative
actions that are more than minimally intrusive. Schulhofer argues that this
interpretation is not only consistent with the intent of the Framers, but
remains a crucial means of discouraging government officials from harassing
innocent people, promoting citizen cooperation with law enforcement efforts,
and protecting the speech and association rights that are indispensable to a
well-functioning democracy.6
Schulhofer's liberal take on the Fourth Amendment is largely
persuasive. This Review points out a few places where Schulhofer may push
the envelope too far or not far enough. But, these quibbles aside, More
Essential Than Ever is a welcome reminder for scholars and the public at
large that the Fourth Amendment is a fundamental bulwark of constitutional
jurisprudence and deserves more respect than the Supreme Court has given
it.
II.

Judicial Review as a Means of Protecting Privacy and Limiting
Discretion

More Essential Than Ever is composed of eight chapters, the first two
of which set up the rest of the book. Chapter 1 sketches out the thesis that
was just described. In the course of doing so, Schulhofer describes his views
on the core purpose of the Fourth Amendment. While he appears to accept
the Supreme Court's stance that the scope of the Fourth Amendment is
defined primarily by reasonable expectations of privacy, he reminds us that
the Amendment explicitly speaks not of privacy but of "the right of the
people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers and effects."8 Thus, he
reasons, the Fourth Amendment is not about privacy in the sense of keeping
secrets, but rather protects privacy as a means of ensuring people are secure
in their ability to control information vis-A-vis the government.9 To the

6. See id. at 6 ("[The Fourth Amendment] offers a shelter from governmental intrusions that
unjustifiably disturb our peace of mind and our capacity to thrive as independent citizens in a
vibrant democratic society.").
7. See Kyllo v. United States, 533 U.S. 27, 33 (2001) (stating that a Fourth Amendment search
occurs if "'the individual manifested a subjective expectation of privacy in the object of the
challenged search,' and 'society [is] willing to recognize that expectation as reasonable"' (quoting
California v, Ciraolo, 476 U.S. 207, 211 (1986))).
8. SCHULHOFER, supra note 5, at 7 (citation omitted) (emphasis in original).
9. See id. at 10 (arguing that it never would have occurred to Americans in the eighteenth
century that "by entering into relationships with others, they had given the government unrestricted
access to any information they revealed to trusted social and professional associates"). Schulhofer
later clarifies that the Fourth Amendment is about "the right to control knowledge about our
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argument that innocent people should have nothing to fear from law
enforcement discovery of private information, especially when it can be
discovered without physical intrusion, Schulhofer has the following riposte:
"[S]urveillance can have an inhibiting effect on those who are different,
chilling their freedom to read what they choose, to say what they think, and
to join with others who are like-minded."10 And when this occurs without
justification, "[it] undermine[s] politics and impoverish[es] social life for
everyone." 1
It has become fashionable to criticize the idea that Fourth Amendment
search doctrine is meant to protect privacy. Critics claim that the Fourth
Amendment is really about government power,12 protecting property rights,' 3
or preventing coercion. 14 But all of the guarantees in the Bill of Rights are
about restricting government power. The Fourth Amendment focuses on
protecting particularindividual interests from certain types of government
power, and Schulhofer is right that privacy, construed to mean control of
information from unjustified government access, is the dominant focus of
Fourth Amendment doctrine,15 at least as it applies to searches.16 The Fourth
Amendment's prohibition on unauthorized government monitoring of our
activities, thoughts, and plans is a potent limit on official power that protects
against trespass and official coercion but also protects against much more.
Chapter 2 provides a survey of the historical conflicts and cases that led
to the Fourth Amendment. Schulhofer does a masterful job telling the story
of the general warrant. He begins with the sagas of two Englishmen wellpersonal lives, the right to decide how much information gets revealed to whom and for which
purposes." Id. at 130.
10. SCHULHOFER, supranote 5, at 13.
11. Id. at 14.
12. See, e.g., Paul Ohm, The Fourth Amendment in a World Without Privacy, 81 MIss. L.J.

1309, 1338 (2012) ("The new constitutional lodestar, power, is the Fourth Amendment's third act
[after property and privacy].. .. Power seems to be the amendment's essence, not merely a proxy
for something deeper."); Raymond Shih Ray Ku, The Founders' Privacy: The Fourth Amendment
and the Power of Technological Surveillance, 86 MINN. L. REV. 1325, 1326 (2002) ("The Fourth
Amendment protects power not privacy.").
13. Morgan Cloud, A Liberal House Divided: How the Warren Court Dismantled the Fourth
Amendment, 3 OHIO ST. J. CRIM. L. 33, 72 (2005) (arguing for a Fourth Amendment "rooted in

property theories" (emphasis added)).
14. William J. Stuntz, The Substantive Origins of CriminalProcedure, 105 YALE L.J. 393, 446
(1995) (contending that the Fourth Amendment is meant to limit "coercion and violence").
15. See CHRISTOPHER SLOBOGIN, PRIVACY AT RISK: THE NEW GOVERNMENT SURVEILLANCE
AND THE FOURTH AMENDMENT 23-26 (2007) (arguing that privacy is a central value protected by
the Fourth Amendment).

16. Schulhofer confusingly supports his point about the importance of privacy in search cases
by referring to cases involving seizures. SCHULHOFER, supra note 5, at 7 (describing cases
involving the towing of a mobile home and arrests). Seizures are not governed by the expectation
of privacy language used in search cases but rather are defined in terms of interference with
property or movement. Jacobsen v. United States, 466 U.S. 109, 113 (1984) (seizure of property
occurs when there is "some meaningful interference with an individual's possessory interests");
Florida v. Bostick, 501 U.S. 429, 436 (1991) (holding that seizure of a person occurs when he
would not "feel free to .. . terminate the encounter").
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known to Fourth Amendment scholars: John Wilkes, a member of Parliament
whose office was ransacked by government officials seeking proof of
seditious libel under a "nameless warrant,"17 and John Entick, also suspected
of sedition, whose papers were seized pursuant to a warrant issued by an
executive official rather than a judge and that failed to describe the items
sought.' 8 Schulhofer also engagingly describes the hullabaloo in the colonies
over the writs of assistance that allowed British officials to search any place
they desired for evidence of unspecified offenses,' 9 and of course he includes
an account of James Otis's famous denunciation of the writs in 1761 .20 From
this type of evidence, Schulhofer concludes that "there is no doubt that
resistance to discretion lay at the heart" of the Fourth Amendment.2'
Schulhofer is right about that. But he moves from that observation to
the further conclusion that this resistance to the tyranny of every "common
Officer" requires ex ante review by a judge for most searches and seizures.22
Making that connection takes more work. The Entick and Wilkes cases
involved searches for and seizures of papers, and the writs of assistance were
aimed primarily at customed goods held by colonial merchants. The
Framers, mostly from the middle and upper classes, may not have cared very
much about whether seizures of ordinary criminals and searches for evidence
of "street crime" were anticipated by a warrant. 23 Schulhofer himself notes
that warrantless arrests for routine felonies were permitted upon "reasonable
cause"; that warrantless searches pursuant to arrest were routine; and that
searches of ships, wagons, and other property outside the home at least
"occasionally" took place without judicial authorization.24 Even warrantless
searches of homes occurred in colonial times.
So while the Framers hated the general warrant, they did not necessarily
think specific warrants were or should be the primary means of regulating all
types of government investigations. Schulhofer indirectly concedes this
point, 2 6 but insists that modern-day resistance to executive discretion requires
a preference for warrants even in situations in which they may not have been

17. SCHULHOFER, supra note 5, at 24-26.
18. Id at 26-27.
19. Id at 27-30.

20. Id. at 29.
21. Id. at 35.

22. Id. at 36.
23. Indeed, as Schulhofer points out, James Madison supported the Fourth Amendment because
"he feared that popular majorities would enact legislation authorizing broad warrants, to the
disadvantage of the new nation's propertied elite." Id. at 35.
24. Id at 37.
25. Thomas Y. Davies, Recovering the Original Fourth Amendment, 98 MICH. L. REv. 547,
622 (1999) (stating that during the Framing Era "the initiation of arrests and searches commenced

when a crime victim either raised the 'hue and cry' or made a sworn complaint," although also
noting that the hue and cry was probably relegated to "fresh" cases by the late eighteenth century).
26. SCHULHOFER, supranote 5, at 40-41.
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required in colonial times. 27 He gives a number of reasons for this position,
but the most prominent of them is the rise of organized police forces, aided
by technological advances, that have vastly expanded government search and
seizure capacity compared to that possessed by the lonely colonial
constable.28
More broadly, this huge shift in the relative power structure leads
Schulhofer to argue for an analytic approach that focuses on original
principles rather than original rules, which is an approach he dubs "adaptive
originalism." 2 9 On this last point, Schulhofer is in league with a number of
scholars. For instance, Donald Dripps has recently argued that trying to tie
modem rules to specific practices that existed in the eighteenth century
makes no sense in a whole host of uniquely modem situations, including
administrative searches, searches of private papers, investigative stops on
less than probable cause, wiretapping, and the use of gunfire to effect the
arrest of a fleeing felon.3 0 Moreover, even the common law rules that can
sensibly be applied today were in the process of changing in the eighteenth
So, like
century and were not necessarily favored by the Framers.3
Schulhofer, Dripps would ask whether and to what extent a search and
seizure threatens "the priority of individual liberty and privacy, as against
public security, that the founders aspired to."32 The key question remains,
however, whether adaptive or aspirational originalism requires the strong
warrant requirement that Schulhofer favors.
III. A Critique of Modem Search and Seizure Rules
Chapters 3 through 7 of More Essential Than Ever try to answer that
question. They address the Supreme Court's jurisprudence in five general
areas: the overarching rules governing searches and arrests; the special
problems that arise in policing on the streets; the law governing
administrative searches such as health and safety inspections, roadblocks and
drug testing of school children; wiretapping and other electronic searches;
and the dilemmas caused by national security concerns. The theme
throughout these chapters is that, in generating current rules, the Supreme
Court "has increasingly put police convenience above ... original Fourth

27. See id at 41 (arguing that though we should respect the Framers' interpretations of searches
and seizures under the Fourth Amendment, "that respect cannot take the form of an unreflective
commitment to old rules that now have radically different effects in practice").
28. See id. at 40 (arguing that eighteenth-century law enforcement was "a small, poorly
organized, amateur affair, a far cry from the sizeable force of well-armed, full-time police who only
a few years later became a constant presence on the streets of American cities and towns").
29. Id at 39-41.
30. See generally Donald A. Dripps, Responding to the Challenges of Contextual Change and
Legal Dynamism in Interpreting the Fourth Amendment, 81 MISS. L.1 1085 (2012) (proposing

aspirational originalism).
31. Id. at 1089.
32. Id. at 1128.
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Amendment priorities" and thus failed to curb sufficiently the executive
branch's discretion to invade privacy.33
In Chapter 3, entitled "Searches and Arrests," Schulhofer attacks the
Court's unwillingness to exclude evidence when police violate the rule
governing no-knock entries, 34 driving home his point with descriptions of
several incidents in which residents were killed or harmed when surprised by
police.3 ' He disagrees with the Court's decisions allowing pretextual traffic
stops and cajoled consents, 6 and partly as a way of undermining those
decisions he appears to argue that the police should have to obtain a warrant
for all nonexigent arrests, or at least for all nonexigent arrests for crimes that
would have been misdemeanors at common law.3 7 He also seems to think
that warrants should be required for searches of cars in all but the most
exigent circumstances, given the much-expanded use we make of vehicles in
modern times. Finally, he castigates two of the Court's rationalizations for
its retrenchment on the exclusionary rule-the increased professionalism of
the police and the development of alternative remedies 3 9-by arguing that
neither development has progressed far enough to justify the trust the Court
places in law enforcement.40 In Schulhofer's mind, the suppression remedy
is required in order to deter the police and ensure judicial integrity, and
undercutting it as the Court has done breeds lawlessness.4 1
Chapter 4, "Policing Public Spaces," tackles the special problems that
arise in defining seizures of people and the scope of stop-and-frisk doctrine. 4 2
In contrast to many commentators on the liberal end of the spectrum,
Schulhofer would not reverse Terry v. Ohio,43 the Court's iconic case
sanctioning stops and frisks on reasonable suspicion (a level of justification
33. SCHULHOFER, supra note 5, at 44.
34. See generally Hudson v. Michigan, 547 U.S. 586 (2006) (holding that violation of the
knock-and-announce rule does not require exclusion of evidence seized as a result).
35. SCHULHOFER, supra note 5, at 46-47.
36. Whren v. United States, 517 U.S. 806, 817 (1996) (holding that the Fourth Amendment
does not recognize pretext arguments when the police action is based on probable cause);
Schneckloth v. Bustamonte, 412 U.S. 218, 249 (1973) (holding that individuals need not be told of
their right to refuse consent).
37. See SCHULHOFER, supra note 5, at 52 (arguing that the common law exception permitting
warrantless arrest for felonies "should be interpreted narrowly").
38. Schulhofer states that "[m]ost Fourth Amendment experts find it hard to reconcile the
warrant requirement for homes, suitcases, and paper bags with the no-warrant rule for cars," and
dismisses "the practical challenges involved in immobilizing cars on the roadside while waiting for
a search warrant" by noting the availability of telephonic warrants. Id. at 57.
39. Hudson, 547 U.S. at 598-99.
40. See SCHULHOFER, supra note 5, at 67 (commenting that the premise that "executive officers
can be trusted to exercise search-and-seizure powers fairly, in the absence of judicial oversight, is
precisely the assumption that the Fourth Amendment rejects").
41. See id at 69 ("[T]he evidence shows that official disregard for fair procedure weakens
public willingness to respect legal requirements and cooperate with law enforcement efforts to
apprehend offenders.").
42. Id. at 71-92.
43. 392 U.S. 1 (1968).
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short of probable cause).4 He states that "it is hard to imagine how the Court
could have done better" in light of the need to give police flexibility in
dealing with "fast-breaking police actions on the street."4 5 However, he
believes that the Court's subsequent application of Terry and related rulesranging from declarations that seizures do not occur when police chase
fleeing inner-city youth or confront factory workers and bus passengers46 to
its holding that reasonable suspicion exists when individuals in high-crime
little relationship to social or
areas run from the police 4 -"bears
psychological reality."48 These decisions, he argues, have acquiesced in the
creation of racially tinged "police states" that "affect thousands of citizens
every year, undermining their security, their respect for authority, their sense
of acceptance in the wider community, and even their willingness to assist
law enforcement efforts to control crime."49 He urges reversal of these
decisions and commends the Court for striking down vagrancy laws that give
police discretion to harass people pretextually.50
Chapter 5, on "The Administrative State," takes on the most difficult
area of Fourth Amendment jurisprudence-searches and seizures that fall
outside the paradigmatic investigation of street crime because they focus on
garnering evidence for regulatory rather than criminal purposes (as with
health and safety inspections of homes) or on special populations (such as
drug testing of school children). 5' In these situations the Court has either
diluted the warrant requirement by permitting "area warrants" that are not
based on individualized suspicion or has done away with the warrant and
probable cause requirements altogether on the assumption that "special needs
beyond those of ordinary law enforcement" are involved.52 Following the
dissents in these cases, Schulhofer argues instead that departures from the
judicial review requirement be permitted only when: (1) the objective of the
government's enforcement program is important; (2) normal investigative
methods cannot achieve it; (3) the program is implemented through neutral

44. See SCHULHOFER, supra note 5, at 77 (arguing that the Court in Teny "established a
pragmatic framework of relatively flexible powers in order to preserve police capacity to maintain
order in public spaces").
45. Id.

46. United States v. Drayton, 536 U.S. 194, 200 (2002) (holding that the Fourth Amendment is
not implicated when police confront bus passengers and ask for consent to search their luggage);
California v. Hodari D., 499 U.S. 621, 626 (1991) (holding that chasing a fleeing person is not a
seizure); INS v. Delgado, 466 U.S. 210, 218 (1984) (holding that questioning of factory workers is
not a seizure).
47. Illinois v. Wardlow, 528 U.S. 119, 124-25 (2000).
48. SCHULHOFER, supra note 5, at 84.
49. Id. at 92.
50. See, e.g., Chicago v. Morales, 527 U.S. 41, 63-64 (1999) (striking down a statute
criminalizing failure to disperse upon a police command).
51. SCHULHOFER, supra note 5, at 93-114.
52. See generally Eve Brensike Primus, Disentangling Administrative Searches, Ill COLUM. L.

REv. 254 (2011).
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criteria applicable to all; and (4) the primary purpose of the program is not
"prosecutorial."
Thus, for instance, Schulhofer believes the Court was
correct in holding that a drug testing program aimed at political candidates
was unconstitutional 54 (because the government interest was not substantial
enough);5 5 incorrect in upholding sobriety checkpoints,5 6 suspicionless
searches of probationers,s? drug testing of students in nonathletic activities,
and spot inspections of junkyards for stolen parts 9 (because less intrusive
investigative alternatives were available);6 0 and correct in rejecting drug
checkpoints 6' and programs designed to test pregnant women for cocaine62
(because of their dominant prosecutorial purpose). In contrast, health and
safety inspections conducted according to neutral criteria 64 and airport
checkpoints that monitor everyone do pass muster with Schulhofer.
"Wiretapping, Eavesdropping and the Information Age" is the title of
Chapter 6. Schulhofer's primary target here is the Court's so-called "thirdparty doctrine," which holds that when one knowingly exposes information
to others one assumes the risk the government will acquire the information. 66
Relying on this rationale, the Court has concluded that the Fourth
Amendment does not apply to government surveillance of travel on public
roads and government acquisition of phone logs and bank records.6 7 As have
many others,68 Schulhofer notes that under the Court's third-party doctrine,

53. SCHULHOFER, supra note 5, at 97-98.

54. Chandler v. Miller, 520 U.S. 305, 323 (1997).
55. See SCHULHOFER, supra note 5, at 100-01 (praising the Court for assessing the significance

of the State's interest in drug testing political candidates and for determining that it was not
substantial enough to outweigh the privacy interests at stake); Chandler, 520 U.S. at 318.
56. Mich. Dep't of State Police v. Sitz, 496 U.S. 444, 455 (1990).
57. Griffin v. Wisconsin, 483 U.S. 868, 880 (1987).
58. Bd. of Educ. v. Earls, 536 U.S. 822, 838 (2002); Vernonia Sch. Dist. 47J v. Acton, 515 U.S.
646, 665 (1995).
59. New York v. Burger, 482 U.S. 691, 717 (1987).
60. SCHULHOFER, supra note 5, at 101.

61. City of Indianapolis v. Edmond, 531 U.S. 32, 48 (2000).
62. Ferguson v. City of Charleston, 532 U.S. 67, 76 (2001)
63. SCHULHOFER, supra note 5, at 108; Ferguson, 522 U.S. at 83.
64. See Camara v. Mun. Court, 387 U.S. 523, 534 (1967) (holding that the Fourth Amendment
bars prosecution of a person who has refused to permit a warrantless code-enforcement inspection
of his personal residence).
65. Schulhofer also appears to be comfortable with border searches and does not discuss
checkpoints for licenses. SCHULHOFER, supra note 5, at 105. Cf Delaware v. Prouse, 440 U.S.
648, 657 (1979) (permitting such checkpoints in dictum). Since these seizures might be said to have
a dominant "prosecutorial purpose," it is not as clear how they fare under his model.
66. See generally Orin S. Kerr, The Case for the Third-Party Doctrine, 107 MICH. L. REv. 561

(2009) (offering a defense of the often-criticized doctrine).
67. Smith v. Maryland, 442 U.S. 735, 745 (1979) (holding that there is no reasonable
expectation of privacy in phone numbers dialed); United States v. Miller, 425 U.S. 435, 442 (1976)
(holding that there is no reasonable expectation of privacy in information surrendered to banks).
68. See Erin Murphy, The Case Against the Case for Third-Party Doctrine: A Response to
Epstein and Kerr, 24 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 1239, 1239 (2009) (arguing against the "current
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one cannot reasonably expect privacy from government discovery of
information given to a third party even when the disclosure to that party
occurs with the understanding it is confidential, is made for a specific
purpose only, or is unavoidable if one wants to live in modem society.69
Schulhofer's adaptive originalism leads him to reject this result.70 He points
out that "[t]he colonists who conferred with friends while planning the
American revolution did not think that by sharing confidential information
they had lost their right to exclude strangers," 7 and they certainly did not
72
think they had thereby lost their right to exclude the government.
Furthermore, he continues, the Court's equation of citizen or institutional
third parties with government agents is nonsensical in the modern age."
Schulhofer points out that "we routinely deny government the power to
pursue actions that are freely available to individuals"-such as practicing a
particular religion-and, more importantly, "[t]he extraordinary resources
available to the government give it unique power and unique potential to
threaten the liberty and autonomy of individuals." 4
Thus, Schulhofer believes that the tracking of a car using a GPS device,
as occurred in the recent case of United States v. Jones, is a Fourth
Amendment search that requires a warrant based on probable cause even
when it is not effectuated by a trespass on the car76 (the limitation on the
definition of search endorsed by the majority in Jones).n He strongly
endorses Justice Sotomayor's concurring opinion in that case voicing
concern that even brief locational tracking can chill freedoms, and he
rejects the gist of Justice Alito's concurring opinion, which would apply the

configuration" of the third-party doctrine rule that holds that "information disclosed to third parties
receives no Fourth Amendment protection").
69. SCHULHOFER, supra note 5, at 126-34.
70. See also Lawrence B. Solum, Faith and Fidelity: Originalism and the Possibility of

ConstitutionalRedemption, 91 TExAs L. REv. 147, 154 (2012) (noting that "[a]lmost all originalists
agree that courts should view themselves as constrained by original meaning and that very good
reasons are required for legitimate departures from that constraint").
71. SCHULHOFER, supra note 5, at 130.

72. Id.
73. See id at 128-32 (critiquing the notion that citizens have the option of communicating by
means other than the internet or telephone and arguing that those communications should be
protected).
74. Id. at 136.
75. 132 S. Ct. 945 (2012).
76. See SCHULHOFER, supra note 5, at 139 (citing Jones, 132 S. Ct. at 960 (Alito, J.,
concurring)) (expressing agreement with Justice Alito's concurring opinion that the police tactics at
issue in Jones were unacceptable interferences with privacy rights).
77. See Jones, 132 S. Ct. at 954 ("It may be that achieving the same result through electronic
means, without an accompanying trespass, is an unconstitutional invasion of privacy, but the present
case does not require us to answer that question.").
78. Id at 956-57 (Sotomayor, J., concurring) (stating that "[a]wareness that the Government
may be watching chills associational and expressive freedoms" and also stating "it may be
necessary to reconsider the premise that an individual has no reasonable expectation of privacy in
information voluntarily disclosed to third parties").
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Fourth Amendment only to "prolonged tracking" and only as long as the
public does not itself begin engaging in such tracking for convenience or
security purposes.79 Schulhofer would not always require a warrant when
government seeks information from third parties or in every case of knowing
exposure, however.8 0 For instance, he endorses the practice of obtaining
records via a subpoena, challengeable by the target.8 ' And even in the case
of surveillance, Schulhofer would only dictate that a search has occurred
when police use "technology that is not widely available,"82 suggesting that
he believes nontechnological surveillance or surveillance with technology
that is in "general public use" can escape Fourth Amendment regulation. 83
Chapter 7 deals with "The National Security Challenge," a development
that has threatened to undercut Fourth Amendment principles even further. 84
Schulhofer reminds us that we have come to deeply regret past overreactions
to outside dangers and suggests we will similarly end up ruing post-9/11
phenomena such as the detentions in Guantanamo Bay, the Patriot Act's
sneak-and-peek warrants,8 5 National Security Letters authorizing FBI agents
to gather up any records that are useful in "criminal, tax, and regulatory
matters, ,,86 and the expansion of electronic surveillance powers under the
Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act. 7 To Schulhofer, these departures
from the norm can actually have a negative effect on national security
because they overwhelm the government with information, distract officials
from more effective methods of protecting the country, and discourage
cooperation by those groups in society most likely to have information about
potential foreign threats.

79. Id at 962-64 (Alito, J., concurring) ("New technology may provide increased convenience
or security at the expense of privacy, and many people may find the tradeoff worthwhile ... [or]
reconcile themselves to this development as inevitable.").
80. See infra notes 81-82 and accompanying text.
81. SCHULHOFER, supra note 5, at 134.

82. See id at 142 (noting that "no one suggests that government data mining should be
prohibited altogether" and that the Fourth Amendment is only intended to "assure that invasive
methods of investigation are subject to oversight").
83. The "general public use" nomenclature comes from dictum in Kyllo v. United States, 533
U.S. 27, 34 (2001).
84. SCHULHOFER, supra note 5, at 144-69.

85. 18 U.S.C. § 3103(a) (2006). Schulhofer would not object to all sneak-and-peek warrants,
however. See SCHULHOFER, supra note 5, at 48.

86. 12 U.S.C. § 3414(a)(5)(A) (2006); 18 U.S.C. § 2709(b) (2006).
87. 50 U.S.C. §§ 1801-1885c (2006 & Supp. IV 2011).
88. See SCHULHOFER, supra note 5, at 168 (arguing that "[piroposals ... to relax Fourth
Amendment requirements and 'trade-off' liberty for security ... make counterterrorism efforts more
difficult, not less"). He goes on to discuss the ways in which Muslim Americans are less likely to
cooperate with authorities if they believe the police are targeting their communities without
explanation. Id.
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IV. A Critique of the Critique
Schulhofer makes a compelling case for privacy as the linchpin of
Fourth Amendment protection and for making ex ante review of police
search and seizure decisions the default regulatory stance. Also persuasive is
his position that the Amendment should be viewed as a crucial means of
preserving democracy, encouraging diversity of views, and promoting citizen
respect for and cooperation with police work. Finally, adaptive originalism
makes eminent sense in a country with a strong foundational document that
is over two hundred years old. In short, I am in agreement with the broad
strokes of the book. I'm not as sure about all the particulars.
For instance, many vibrant Western democracies have been able to
control their police without the draconian remedy of exclusion. Contrary to
Schulhofer's assertion,90 routine suppression of evidence found through a
Fourth Amendment violation probably delegitimizes the legal system in the
eyes of most citizens, 91 and thus may contribute to the dissatisfaction with
Furthermore, in many
government that Schulhofer wants to avoid.
situations-for instance, the violence and property damage that sometimes
accompany illegal no-knock entries-monetary restitution is a more
commensurate response than exclusion of evidence, as well as more
satisfying when the victim of such acts is innocent of the crime and thus
cannot resort to exclusion. Properly constructed, an action for damages9 2
the only remedy for illegal searches available in colonial times9-is more
likely to accomplish all of the goals Schulhofer seeks: respect for
government (because it punishes the true perpetrators of the illegality, not the
prosecutor); deterrence of misconduct (especially in pretextual traffic and
suspect drug possession cases, which wallet-conscious police will decide are
not worth pursuing); improved professionalism (resulting from police
departments literally having to pay the cost of bad training); and greater use
of warrants (which police will realize immunizes them from liability).9 4
While Schulhofer argues that an effective damages remedy would foreclose

89. See generally Craig Bradley, Mapp Goes Abroad, 52 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 375 (2001)
(recounting resistance to, or significant limitations on, the exclusionary remedy in Europe,
Australia, and Canada).
90. See SCHULHOFER, supra note 5, at 69 (arguing that "judicial tolerance for Fourth
Amendment violations" creates problems for law enforcement because it "discourages law-abiding
citizens from offering the cooperation needed to catch and convict offenders in future cases").
91. As Schulhofer admits, "Fourth Amendment requirements often garner little public support
[because] [tihey seem like a gift to those bent on wrongdoing." Id. at 171.
92. See, e.g., 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (2006) (providing a civil action for the deprivation of
constitutional rights); Bivens v. Six Unknown Agents of Fed. Bureau of Narcotics, 403 U.S. 388,
390-97 (1971) (recognizing an action for damages when a plaintiffs injuries resulted from federal
agents' violation of the Fourth Amendment).
93. See SCHULHOFER, supra note 5, at 67 ("[J]udicial oversight originally did not involve an
exclusionary rule; the deterrent to an illegal search was the victim's ability to sue for damages").
94. See generally Christopher Slobogin, Why Liberals Should Chuck the Exclusionary Rule,
1999 U. ILL. L. REV. 363, 445-46 (summarizing the advantages of a damages remedy).
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just as many prosecutions as the exclusionary rule, he may be wrong on that
score;95 in any event, a damages remedy would not flaunt the costs of the
Fourth Amendment in the delegitimizing way the rule does, or involve
judges, lawyers, and juries in trials they know are charades. As an
alternative to attacking police abuse of discretion on the street by vastly
reducing arrests for minor crimes (which is the effect of Schulhofer's more
stringent arrest warrant requirement), the exclusionary remedy might best be
reserved in such cases for evidence not related to the purpose of the search
and seizure, a move that should maximize deterrence of pretextual actions
and spurious consents.
The procedural justice literature upon which Schulhofer relies to make
many of his arguments may also undercut some of his conclusions, especially
in connection with regulation of large-scale crime-control efforts.97
Schulhofer is right that parts of our cities, especially those occupied by
minority groups, mimic police states, and the Court's willingness to blink at
this state of affairs is outrageous, as well as complicit in discouraging
cooperation with the authorities. At the same time, these communities are
rife with crime, and their efforts to deal with that problem-through
appropriately limited loitering statutes, camera surveillance, drug
checkpoints, and the like-should not be foreclosed when they are the
product of local democratic deliberations.9 8
After all, the Framers
themselves passed statutes permitting suspicionless inspections and searches,
some of which were aimed at obtaining evidence of crime.99 The principal
defect of most of the administrative search and seizure cases heard by the
Supreme Court to date is that they involved ad hoc programs established by
the executive branch. 00 If instead authorization from a representative
legislative body is required, if the legislation does not single out a discrete
95. Id at 444 ("With an effective deterrent in place, police who lack probable cause will not
necessarily give up; the more reasonable assumption is that they will simply get more cause.").
96. Ricardo J. Bascuas, Lessons from the Highway and the Subway: A PrincipledApproach to

Suspicionless Searches, 38 RUTGERS L.J. 719, 787-90 (2007) (making this argument).
97. Schulhofer's most explicit work on this subject is Stephen J. Schulhofer et al., American
Policing at a Crossroads: Unsustainable Policies and the ProceduralJustice Alternative, 101 J.

CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 335 (2011).
98. See Tracey L. Meares, Norms, Legitimacy and Law Enforcement, 79 OR. L. REV. 391, 410-

13 (2000) (using loitering statutes to illustrate the importance of involving the community in
devising effective law enforcement strategies in order to enhance legitimacy).
99. See Fabio Arcila, The Death ofSuspicion, 51 WM. & MARY L. REv. 1275, 1304-10 (2010)
(discussing various Revolutionary period statutes that permitted suspicionless searches).
100. See, e.g., Ferguson v. City of Charleston, 532 U.S. 67, 71-72 (2001) (scrutinizing a policy
authorizing drug testing of pregnant women formulated by hospital officials and local police); Mich.
Dep't of State Police v. Sitz, 496 U.S. 444, 447 (1990) (involving a highway sobriety checkpoint
established by the police department); City of Indianapolis v. Edmond, 531 U.S. 32, 34-35 (2000)
(reviewing a drug roadblock established by local police); New York v. Burger, 482 U.S. 691, 69394 (1987) (examining a junkyard inspection program established by legislation but providing no
limits on police discretion); Skinner v. R'y Labor Execs. Ass'n, 489 U.S. 602, 608-12 (1989)
(analyzing a drug testing program for railway workers authorized by legislation that provided no
standards for implementation).
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and insular minority, and if it is implemented in a nondiscriminatory fashion
(e.g., across-the-board or randomly), a better balance between crime control
and individual rights might be achieved.10 ' Nullification of such legislation
probably would have more community-denigrating effects than the Court's
current jurisprudence.
The same types of points can be made about national security
surveillance endeavors, often aimed at accumulating information about
thousands or hundreds of thousands of people (virtually all of whom are
innocent of any wrongdoing).' 0 2 If, before voting, legislators are required to
imagine application of these programs to themselves and all of their
constituents, they are not likely to approve 1984-type laws, as evidenced by
Congress's resistance to post-9/11 efforts to expand wiretapping authority 03
and its defunding of the infamous Total Information Awareness data-mining
program. 104 And while courts are capable of figuring out when the legislative
process is defective or when the police are unfairly implementing a
legislatively authorized program, they are not equipped to make the nuanced
determination, required by Schulhofer's approach, as to which law
enforcement techniques are the most effective, least intrusive, most feasible
means of achieving government aims. 0 5 Schulhofer's added stipulation that
prosecution not be the dominant purpose of these programs has the ironic
consequence, as he acknowledges, of providing more privacy protection for
those who may be engaged in criminal activity than those who are not.106
Conversely, when law enforcement has targeted a specific individual,
whether for prosecutorial or other reasons, the legislative process cannot
work and judicial review before the search and seizure takes place is crucial.
For this reason, Schulhofer's disdain for the third-party and knowingexposure doctrines, which often work to vitiate ex ante review, is wellgrounded. What is not as clear is why he would require probable cause for
technologically sophisticated tracking of any length while permitting the
government to obtain bank, credit card, and phone records with a subpoena
(which at most requires a showing that the records are somehow relevant to

101. This approach, based on political process theory, was first proposed by Richard Worf in
The Casefor Rational Basis Review of General Suspicionless Searches and Seizures, 23 TOURO L.

REv. 93, 197-98 (2007), and is developed further in Christopher Slobogin, Government Dragnets,
73 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 107, 143 (2010).
102. See, e.g., Timothy B. Lee, House Approves Another Five Years of Warrantless

Wiretapping, ARS TECHNICA (Sept. 12, 2012), http://arstechnica.com/tech-policy/2012/09/houseapproves-another-five-years-of-warranttess-wiretapping (reporting on the FISA Amendment Act's
goal of intercepting American citizens' international communication).
103. SCHULHOFER, supra note 5, at 158-59.
104. Department of Defense Appropriations Act of 2004, PUB. L. No. 108-87, § 8131, 117 Stat.
1054, 1102 (2003).

105. See Slobogin, supra note 101, at 127-29 (explaining that while the Court can engage
thoughtfully in strict scrutiny analysis in various contexts like time, place, and manner restrictions
on speech, it is ill-equipped to analyze the efficacy and necessity of law enforcement techniques).
106. SCHULHOFER, supra note 5, at 95-96.
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an investigation),o 7 or why he would leave entirely unregulated even longterm surveillance with the naked eye or with generally available
technology. 0 8 In terms of intrusiveness and the chilling effect on innocent
activity-Schulhofer's concerns-record acquisition would seem at least as
intrusive as tracking. 09 Further, tracking with a GPS would seem to be no
more inimical to these interests than monitoring travels with the human
senses or technology in general public use. 0 An alternative would be to
permit both accessing of single-transaction records and short-term trackingwhether the police use naked-eye observation, primitive technology, or
sophisticated devices-on reasonable suspicion, while requiring probable
cause for acquisition of records containing substantial personal information
and more prolonged surveillance."'
It is also not clear how Schulhofer would treat undercover
investigations, since he does not discuss the relevant case law in the book.
Perhaps he would analogize this popular law enforcement technique to
naked-eye and low-tech surveillance, in which case, consistent with Supreme
Court decisions on the issue, it would be unregulated by the Fourth
Amendment." 2 But the ability of undercover agents to insinuate themselves
into personal lives can often result in much more intrusion than even longterm tracking, and thus ought to require at least as much justification (as the
eighteenth-century disdain for undercover "thief-takers" suggests)." 3 Only

107. United States v. R. Enters., Inc., 498 U.S. 292, 301 (1991) (stating that a subpoena should
only be quashed on irrelevance grounds when "there is no reasonable possibility that the category of
materials the government seeks will produce information relevant to the general subject of the grand
jury's investigation"); United States v. Morton Salt, 338 U.S. 632, 652 (1950) (stating that
administrative subpoenas meet constitutional requisites even if they are meant only to satisfy
"nothing more than official curiosity").
108. Indeed, Schulhofer's primary concern with data mining appears to be, not its breadth, but
its use of technology not widely available to the public. See SCHULHOFER, supra note 5, at 142
(making the use of "technology that is not widely available" a critical element of a "search" under
the Fourth Amendment).
109. Cf Christopher Slobogin & Joseph E. Schumacher, Reasonable Expectations ofPrivacy
and Autonomy in Fourth Amendment Cases: An Empirical Look at "Understandings Recognized
and Permitted by Society, " 42 DUKE L.J. 727, 737 (1993) (reporting data indicating that perusal of

bank records is considered more intrusive, by a significant margin, than tracking a car).
110. Schulhofer notes that, at common law, public movements were not considered private.
SCHULHOFER, supra note 5, at 123. But research indicates that "conspicuously" following someone
down the street is viewed as fairly intrusive, albeit not as intrusive as technological tracking of a car
for three days. SLOBOGIN, supra note 15, at 112.
111. These points are developed further in Christopher Slobogin, Making the Most of United
States v. Jones in a Surveillance Society: A Statutory Implementation of "Mosaic Theory," DUKE J.

CONST. L. & PUB. POL'Y (forthcoming 2012) and Christopher Slobogin, Is the Fourth Amendment
Relevant in a TechnologicalAge?, in CONSTITUTION 3.0: FREEDOM AND TECHNOLOGICAL CHANGE

11 (Jeffrey Rosen & Benjamin Wittes eds., 2011).
112. See, e.g., Hoffa v. United States, 385 U.S. 293. 302-03 (1966) (holding that the Fourth
Amendment does not apply to evidence voluntarily disclosed to an informant).
113. See JOHN H. LANGBEIN ET AL., HISTORY OF THE COMMON LAW: THE DEVELOPMENT OF
ANGLO-AMERICAN LEGAL INSTITUTIONS 677-81 (2009) (describing police and jury distrust of
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when the third party is neither an agent of the government nor an impersonal
entity like a bank should the third-party doctrine permit government to
acquire the third party's information without any Fourth Amendment
justification. In other words, the Fourth Amendment would be inapplicable
in third-party scenarios only when the third party is independent of the
government and can be said to possess a right (as an autonomous being) to
disclose to the government any information he or she sees fit to reveal.114
Undoubtedly, Professor Schulhofer would have responses to all of these
points. In any event, all of them only attack his thesis at the edges, without
disturbing the crucial attributes of the Fourth Amendment's principles that he
articulates and defends. More Essential Than Ever successfully captures the
essence of the Fourth Amendment in a way that should bring home to
everyone-not just lawyers and judges, but the "I've got nothing to hide"
crowd, the "inner-city folks are all criminals" crowd, and the "government
can be trusted" crowd-why it is so important.

thief-takers, who received rewards for turning in thieves that they often enticed into engaging in
theft).
114. See Mary 1. Coombs, Shared Privacy and the Fourth Amendment, or the Rights of

Relationships, 75 CALIF. L. REV. 1593, 1643 (1987) (arguing that people in possession of
information about others, even information that is "private" and obtained through an intimate
relationship, have an "autonomy-based right to choose to cooperate with the authorities").
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